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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-VEILED REFERENCE TO FAILURE OF DE-
FENDANT TO TESTIFY CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. Bailey v.
State, 287 Ark. 183, 697 S.W.2d 110 (1985).
As fifteen year-old Doris Watson walked past a pool hall in North
Little Rock on the afternoon of April 15, 1984, she was accosted by her
former boyfriend, Bruce Bailey. Bailey forced her into a room at the
Oasis Motel, where she was tied up, beaten with an extension cord, and
raped three times. After twenty-four hours, Watson managed to
escape.
Bailey was arrested and tried for rape and kidnapping. He did not
take the stand at trial. The prosecutor made the following statements
to the jury in his closing argument: "The only thing that we've heard
here today about which occurred in that room is from Doris Watson.
She's the only one. These two ladies that were called, they weren't in
that room." 1
Defense counsel, after objecting to the statement as an improper
reference to the failure of the defendant to testify, moved for a mistrial.
The court denied the motion. The jury convicted Bailey on both counts
and sentenced him to two concurrent fifty-year prison terms.'
Bailey appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court and argued that
the prosecutor violated his federal fifth amendment right to be free
from self-incrimination by making an improper reference to his failure
to testify. The court reversed the conviction, holding that the comment
constituted a veiled reference to Bailey's failure to testify and thus vio-
lated the state statutory provision which provides that no presumption
shall be created when an accused fails to testify. Bailey v. State, 287
Ark. 183, 697 S.W.2d 110 (1985).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a
criminal case.3 However, early Supreme Court decisions established
that a defendant could not claim this protection in a state criminal pro-
ceeding unless state law so provided. The Supreme Court made it clear
that a criminal defendant's fifth amendment right to be free from self-
incrimination was not made applicable to the states by virtue of the
I. Bailey v. State, 287 Ark. 183, 184, 697 S.W.2d 110 (1985).
2. Record at 16, Bailey.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
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fourteenth amendment." The Court also rejected a contention that a
state statute which authorized a prosecutorial comment on the defend-
ant's failure to testify violated the defendant's right to a fair trial em-
bodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5
In 1964, the Supreme Court overruled its prior holdings and held
that the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion is applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. 6
One year later in Griffin v. California,7 the Court was faced with a
prosecutor's comment concerning the defendant's failure to testify
rather than a defendant who was forced to testify. The Court extended
fifth amendment protection to the defendant in this situation and held
that the comment was impermissible.'
The decision dealt state prosecutors a harsh blow, but the Court
later limited the severity of the rule. In Chapman v. California9 the
Court was faced with a clear violation of the rule it had established in
Griffin. Rather than automatically reversing the conviction, however,
the Court formulated a "harmless constitutional error" rule: 10 an error
of constitutional proportions may be deemed harmless error and the
conviction left undisturbed if the state can meet its burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the ver-
dict obtained."
The Court further extended the harmless constitutional error rule
in United States v. Hasting.la There, the Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit's order of a new trial's and stated: "Since Chapman, the Court
has consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to
consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harm-
less, including most constitutional violations .... "4 The Court em-
4. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). The Court held that neither the privileges
and immunities clause nor the due process clause secures an exemption from compulsory self-
incrimination in a state proceeding.
S. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
6. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964).
7. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
8. Id. at 615. Specifically, the Court held that California's constitutional provision and prac-
tice of placing a penalty on the exercise of a person's right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself violated the fifth amendment.
9. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
10. Id. at 22.
I1. Id. at 23-24.
12. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
13. United States v. Hasting, 660 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1981). Specifically, the prosecutor al-
luded to the failure of the defendants to deny raping and kidnapping the three victims.
14. 461 U.S. at 509. The Court cited Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (errone-
ously admitted testimony held harmless error); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (erro-
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phasized that "the interest in the prompt administration of justice and
the interests of the victims" should be weighed in passing upon the
applicability of the harmless constitutional error rule.15
The Supreme Court's early decision in Twining and its subsequent
holding in Griffin, which overruled it, have actually done little to affect
Arkansas law. In 1885 the Arkansas legislature provided for statutory
protection of the criminal defendant's fifth amendment rights.16 The
Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently handed down a series of deci-
sions holding that any comment by a prosecutor concerning a defend-
ant's failure to testify created a presumption against the defendant in
violation of the statute and required automatic reversal.17
The court was faced with the obvious dilemma of determining ex-
actly when a comment constituted a reference to the defendant's si-
lence. In Blackshare v. State" the court made a narrow distinction
between a reference to the defendant's silence and a reference to the
failure of the defendant to rebut the state's case. The prosecutor in
Blackshare had stated, "I want to know . . . if property can be stolen
and no explanation be offered, and a man go scot free." 9 In holding
the comment permissible, the court noted that the statement in ques-
tion could not fairly be construed as a reference to the failure of the
defendant to testify. Instead, it was merely a statement of opinion by
the prosecutor that the defendant had not offered an explanation for
the evidence presented against him.2" One commentator has reasoned
that Blackshare stands for the proposition that the court will not find a
comment to be error if the comment is not a direct and unequivocal
reference to the defendant or his failure to testify.2' A comparison of
neously admitted confession held harmless error); and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250
(1969) (violation of confrontation clause in state criminal proceeding held harmless error).
15. Id.
16. 1885 Ark. Acts 82 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2016 (1977)) provides:
On the trial of all indictments, informations, complaints, and other proceedings against
persons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses and misdemeanors in the State
of Arkansas, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a
competent witness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any presump-
tion against him.
17. Perry v. State, 188 Ark. 133, 64 S.W.2d 328 (1933); Bridgman v. State, 170 Ark. 709,
280 S.W. 982 (1926); Curtis v. State, 89 Ark. 394, 117 S.W. 521 (1909). There is language in
these decisions that an improper comment is merely "presumptively prejudicial." Although the
concepts of "presumptive prejudice" and automatic reversal are not entirely consistent, the court
did require automatic reversal in all three cases.
18. 94 Ark. 548, 128 S.W. 549 (1910).
19. Id. at 558, 128 S.W. at 554.
20. Id.
21. Hall, The Bounds of Prosecutorial Summation in Arkansas. 28 ARK. L. REv. 55, 72
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various prosecutorial comments held permissible or impermissible in
other Arkansas Supreme Court decisions apparently substantiates this
conclusion.22
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chap-
man in 1967, the Arkansas Supreme Court had the opportunity on sev-
eral occasions to apply the new harmless constitutional error rule in
cases involving alleged improper prosecutorial comments, but ruled on
other grounds. In all of the cases, the court concluded that the com-
ments were nothing more than fair comments on the evidence.2 3 How-
ever, the court did recognize the doctrine in cases involving other errors
of constitutional dimension soon after Chapman was decided. 24 The
first application of a harmless error doctrine in a case involving an im-
proper prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to testify oc-
curred in Powell v. State in 1971.25 There, the Arkansas Supreme
Court relied upon the state statutory harmless error provision 28 and de-
clined to reverse.
The Arkansas Supreme Court did not apply the Chapman harm-
less constitutional error rule to a comment on a defendant's silence un-
til 1974. In Clark v. State 7 the court held that the error was harmless
since none of the jurors had heard the statement. Since then, the appli-
cability of the Chapman rule in all cases involving alleged violations of
a defendant's constitutional rights has become well settled in
(1974).
22. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 96 Ark. 7, 14, 130 S.W. 547, 549 (1910) ("[lIt is undisputed
and undenied in this case and he cannot deny it"); Blackshare v. State, 94 Ark. 548, 128 S.W.
549 (1910) ("1 want to know ...if property can be stolen and no explanation be offered, and a
man go scot free."). Both comments were held permissible. Cf. Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 590, 591,
401 S.W.2d 15 (1966) ("The defendant has chosen not to take the stand and that is his privilege
. .. ); Perry v. State, 188 Ark. 133, 134, 64 S.W.2d 328 (1933) ([Tihe defendant has not
denied a single, solitary iota of evidence that has been given against him from the stand here
today."). Both comments were held reversible error. Post-Chapman decisions also seem to fit
neatly into the test. See Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122 (1968) (comment that
state's case was "uncontradicted and undenied"); Shaddox v. State, 244 Ark. 747, 749, 427
S.W.2d 198, 199 (1968) ("And nobody has attempted to explain that away, in fact, I guess they
couldn't.") Both comments were held permissible.
23. Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122 (1968); Hammond v. State, 244 Ark.
1113, 428 S.W.2d 639 (1968); Shaddox v. State, 244 Ark. 747, 427 S.W.2d 198 (1968).
24. Wilburn v. State, 253 Ark. 608, 487 S.W.2d 600 (1972) (violation of defendant's right to
counsel held harmless error); Thom v. State, 248 Ark. 180, 450 S.W.2d 550 (1970) (illegal search
and seizure held harmless error).
25. 251 Ark. 46, 471 S.W.2d 333 (1971).
26. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1012 (1977) provides: "No indictment is insufficient, nor can the
trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon, be affected by any defect which does not tend to the
prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant on the merit."
27. 256 Ark. 658, 509 S.W.2d 812 (1974).
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Arkansas."8
In Bailey v. State,29 Justice Newbern spoke for the majority and
primarily relied upon the state's statutory guarantee of protection of
the defendant's fifth amendment rights. The court cited Evans and
Foust v. State"0 and Bridgman v. State,"' two cases decided prior to
Chapman. Those cases stand for the proposition that a violation of the
statute by the prosecutor requires automatic reversal. 2 While the court
cited Chapman as the "principal contemporary case on protection of
the U.S. constitutional right to remain silent, '3 3 it disclaimed any reli-
ance upon that decision. Nevertheless, the court concluded that its posi-
tion is reinforced by that case.34
In addition to seemingly reintroducing a rule requiring automatic
reversal, the court found that the particular comment made was a
veiled reference to the failure of the defendant to testify and was no
more permissible than a direct reference.38 The court noted that veiled
references have constituted grounds for reversal in prior cases.38
Finally, the court pointed out that prior cases have drawn a dis-
tinction between "remarks which seem meant to refer to the defend-
ant's failure personally to dispute the state's case as opposed to the
failure of the defense to present any witness or evidence to dispute the
state's case." The former remarks are impermissible and the latter per-
missible, the court noted.3 7 Thus, the reasoning of the court seems to be
that the prosecutor's actual intent, as well as his choice of words, are
important factors to consider in determining whether the comment is
permissible.
Justice Hays, in a relatively lengthy dissent, noted several weak-
nesses in the court's reasoning. First, he stated that "finding the divid-
ing line between 'veiled references' that are permissible as opposed to
28. See Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1847
(1985); Hobbs v. State, 277 Ark. 271, 641 S.W.2d 9 (1982); Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536, 566
S.W.2d 387 (1978).
29. 287 Ark. 183, 184, 697 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1985).
30. 221 Ark. 793, 255 S.W.2d 967 (1953).
31. 170 Ark. 709, 280 S.W. 982 (1926).
32. 287 Ark. at 184, 697 S.W.2d at I11.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The court cited Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536, 538, 566 S.W.2d 387, 388 (1978),
where the comment, "To convict him you don't have to disbelieve any part of their case, because
what did the defense, how many witnesses did the defense put on for your consideration?" was
held reversible error.
37. 287 Ark. at 185, 697 S.W.2d at I11.
1985-86]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
those that are not is too subjective . *.". . " He suggested that when
certain prosecutorial comments are "marginal and fall within what
might be called 'veiled references,' " the court should defer to the dis-
cretion of the trial court in determining their permissibility. 9 Second,
Justice Hays pointed out that the prosecutor's comment was nothing
more than a fair comment on the evidence; it did not necessarily refer
to the failure of Bailey to testify because there was another person
(Bailey's brother) in the room to which the prosecutor referred in his
comment.4 0 Finally, Justice Hays emphasized that "a mistrial is a dras-
tic remedy ' 41 and that the particular remarks in Bailey did not create
prejudice sufficient to justify resorting to such a remedy. 2
The court's reasoning and decision in Bailey are flawed in two sig-
nificant respects and represent a marked departure from its prior hold-
ings. First, it is obvious that the court has reintroduced a rule requiring
automatic reversal in a case in which an improper comment is made.
Seemingly, the court has suspended its application of the Chapman
harmless constitutional error rule. The court relied on cases decided
prior to Chapman to support its holding-decisions which rested on a
strict application of the state statute and which refused to recognize the
existence of any discretion to consider a harmless error rule of any sort.
The court cited Chapman in its decision but confused that rule with the
rule of Griffin. Clearly, a reference to Chapman as the "principal con-
temporary case on protection of the U.S. constitutional right to remain
silent"43 is wrong. In fact, Chapman and its harmless constitutional er-
ror rule have significantly reduced the impact and severity of the Grif-
fin rule that a comment by a prosecutor on the defendant's silence vio-
lates the defendant's federal fifth amendment rights. Interestingly, the
state presented an extensive argument that the rule of Chapman was
applicable to the facts of Bailey in light of the overwhelming evidence
of guilt presented at trial." The court's failure to even acknowledge the
possibility that the error could have been harmless lends support for the
conclusion that the court has retreated from the Chapman rule to one
requiring automatic reversal. If this was the court's intent, the decision
represents a major digression. In United States v. Hasting,45 the United
38. Id. at 186, 697 S.W.2d at 112. (Hays, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 187, 697 S.W.2d at 112.
42. Id. at 187-88, 697 S.W.2d at 112-13.
43. 287 Ark. at 184, 697 S.W.2d at II1.
44. Brief for Appellee at 2-3, Bailey v. State, 287 Ark. 183, 697 S.W.2d 110 (1985).
45. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
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States Supreme Court made it clear that protecting a defendant's con-
stitutional rights is not the only interest at stake in a criminal case; the
prompt administration of justice and the victim's interest in not being
subjected to the rigors of another trial are also important. The review-
ing court has a duty to balance all of these interests."' Meaningless
protection of a defendant's constitutional rights when such protection
will have little, if any, influence on the outcome of a particular case
prevents the court from performing its essential duty.
Second, the court's novel "veiled reference" test does little more
than place a darker cloud over an already unclear area of Arkansas
law. The rule which seemed to emerge from the cases prior to Bailey
was that a comment was permissible if it did not constitute a direct and
unequivocal reference to the defendant's silence. The court in Bailey
effectively dissolved that rule. Arguably, under the majority's test al-
most all of the comments held permissible in prior cases could consti-
tute "veiled references" to the defendant's failure to testify.
A more workable test is needed. Under present Arkansas law, and
especially in the wake of Bailey, prosecuting attorneys are clearly in a
precarious position. Defense attorneys have been provided with a valua-
ble appellate weapon, and prosecuting attorneys will have to choose
their words with great care. The facts in Bailey presented the Arkansas
Supreme Court with the opportunity to announce a more objective,
workable test and reach a correct and fair result as well. If the particu-
lar comment in question could be construed as a reference to someone
other than the defendant, the court should refrain from assuming that
the comment is a reference to the defendant. The First, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits have adopted a similar rule. 8 While the test's applica-
bility would be limited to factual situations similar to those of Bailey, it
would at least begin to establish a more objective standard for evaluat-
ing prosecutorial comments and would dispose of some of the cases in a
predictable manner.
The Arkansas Supreme Court should also defer more to the dis-
cretion of the trial court in evaluating the probable impact upon the
46. Id. at 509.
47. See Bailey, 287 Ark. 183, 186, 697 S.W.2d 110, 112 (1985) (Hays, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Hays pointed out that there is practically no difference between the comment made in Bailey
and a comment such as "Doris Watson's testimony that she was raped, beaten, and kept prisoner
is uncontradicted and undenied." A comment similar to the latter was allowed in Moore v. State,
244 Ark. 1197, 1210, 429 S.W.2d 122, 130 (1968).
48. See Ruiz v. United States, 365 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1966); Desmond v, United States,
345 F.2d 225 (Ist Cir. 1965); Garcia v. United States, 315 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 855 (1963).
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jury of an alleged improper comment. "The court is in a position to
note the manner of delivery of such statements and the inflections or
emphasis used and is therefore in the better position to understand how
the jury perceived it.""9 Whether a particular comment is or is not a
reference to the failure of the defendant to testify is a factual finding
which should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.
Craig Lambert
49. Pruett v. State, 282 Ark. 304, 312, 669 S.W.2d 186, 191 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
362 (1984); see also Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982).
[Vol. 8:747
